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Abstract
Although the one-factor Ricardian trade model with external economies
of scale plays a signiﬁcant role for the understanding of important trade
issues under increasing returns, it lacks a compelling graphical represen-
tation. We propose a convincing graphical exposition that uses both the
PPF and a labor market graph.
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1 Introduction
Increasing returns to scale (IRS) generated by external economies have become
a main feature of many economic models that deal with trade gains, endoge-
nous growth, multiplicity of equilibria, and indeterminacy in dynamic models
of growth1. The simplest route to understand a basic mechanism in these mod-
els is the one-sector Ricardian trade model with IRS. Yet, this model lacks a
compelling graphical representation.2 The purpose of this note is to oﬀer such
a representation. Our experience indicates that this graphical approach helps
the reader to gain, almost eﬀortlessly, a clear understanding of the eﬀect of IRS
on trade gains.
¤E-mail addresses: kikuchi@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp (Kikuchi), ngo.long@mcgill.ca (Long).
1Jones (1968), Herberg and Kemp (1969), Kemp (1969, ch. 8), Melvin (1969), Panagariya
(1981) and Ethier (1982) are key contributions to the IRS literature in the static trade theory.
Helpman and Krugman (1985, ch. 3) provides a comprehensive survey. For indeterminacy in
models of trade and growth with IRS, see Nishimura and Shimomura (2002).
2Francois and Nelson (2002) is a notable exception. They develop a general graphical
framework for division of labor models.
1In most textbooks on international economics, the analysis of trade gains
under external economies of scale relies either on the utilization of Produc-
tion Possibility Frontier (PPF) diagrams or partial equilibrium diagrams.3 One
of the great traditions in the analysis of international trade is the exposition
of canonical models (e.g., Ricardo, Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson) using simple
graphical representations. It is useful both providing an intuitive grasp of the
theory and for pedagogical purposes. We believe that the focus on the extensive
use of trade models with external economies of scale should be accompanied by
a canonical geographical representation.
In this note, we propose the use of a combination of the PPF graph and
a labor market graph to facilitate the understanding of Ricardian trade gains
under external economies of scale.4 By using these graphs, one can easily de-
compose Ricardian trade gains under external economies of scale. In addition,
for educational purposes, the inclusion of labor market graphs in a lecture on
the Ricardian Model lays a useful groundwork for later lectures which deal with
the Speciﬁc-Factors Model and International Factor Movements.
2 Analysis
Consider a Ricardian economy which produces two goods (good 1 and good 2)
with one factor of production, labor.5 Let Yi and Li denote respectively the
output and employment levels of industry i.
Good 1 is produced in a competitive industry under external economies of
scale. The output of the representative ﬁrm (employing `1 units of labor) is
given by
y1 = (L1)
±`1; ± ¸ 0; (1)
where the ﬁrm takes (L1)
± as exogenous. The ﬁrm perceives that its marginal
product of labor is (L1)
± which it takes as a constant. Aggregating over all the





1; " ´ 1 + ±
Therefore at the industry level, the marginal product of labor is "L±
1 > L±
1 if
± > 0. We call "L±
1 the marginal social product of labor in sector 1, and L±
1 the
marginal private product of labor, as perceived by the ﬁrms. Here ² is the degree
of external economies of scale: ² = 1 corresponds to the case without external
economies of scale. Let aLi denote the amount of labor needed to produce one












3See Bowen, Hollander, and Viaene (1998), Caves, Frankel, and Jones (2002, ch. 3) for the
former examples, while Krugman and Obstfeld (2008, ch. 6), for the latter example.
4Kikuchi and Long (2010) apply these methods to the standard Ricardian model without
external economies of scale.
5The model is taken from Ethier (1982). See also Panagariya (1981).
2Thus a greater employment level L1 results in a lower value of aL1.
Good 2 is the numeraire good. It is produced by a competitive industry
under constant-returns-to-scale technology, so that aL2 is a constant.
Then the PPF is represented by
aL1Y1 + aL2Y2 = (Y1)
1=² + aL2Y2 = L (3)
where L is the total amount of labor. With ² > 1, the marginal social cost of
good 1 in terms of good 2 falls as Y1 increases; this gives rise to a convex PPF,
V P, depicted at Figure 1 (a).6 Also, the marginal social cost of good 1 in terms
of good 2 is lower than its private counterpart.7
Let ¹ be the expenditure share on good 1. In autarky, the relative price of
good 1 is obtained as follows. First, from the deﬁnition of ¹, and using the facts
that in the Ricardian model national income equals the wage bill, wL, and that
the price equals labour cost per unit of output, so that w = p2=aL2, we can
write
p1Y1 = ¹(p1Y1 + p2Y2) = ¹wL = ¹L
p2
aL2






























































where the superscript A represents the autarkic equilibrium. The autarkic price
ratio is obtained as line V A.
6When there are more factors, the shape of the PPF will in general be determined by the
tension between (1) diﬀerences in factor intensities which tend to make the PPF concave, and
(2) external economies of scale which tends to make the PPF convex. See, Herberg and Kemp
(1969), Kemp (1969, ch. 8), Melvin (1969), and Markusen and Melvin (1984) for discussion.
7The marginal social cost of good 1 in terms of good 2 is (1="aL2)Y
¡±=e
1 and the marginal
private cost of good 1 in terms of good 2 is (1=aL2)Y
¡±=e
1 . Both fall as more of good 1 is
produced along the PPF.
3Now let us add one more panel for a better understanding: Figure 1 (b)
depicts labor allocation between sectors. The horizontal axis represents the
total labor force, L. The quantity of worker employed in sector 1 (resp. sector
2) is measured from the left (resp. right). The left (resp. right) vertical axis
shows the wage rate in the sector 1 (resp. sector 2). Initially, in the autarkic
equilibrium, wage rates are equalized between sectors and O1L1 workers are
hired in sector 1, while L1O2 workers are hired in sector 2. The total income
(in terms of the numeraire, good 2) is shown by the shaded rectangle.
For later use, we add a curve that represents the relationship between the
wage rate (value of average product of labour) in sector 1 and the hypothetical
employment level in that sector, L1, for a given price p1. This hypothetical
curve is denoted by ˜ w1(L1; p1):






The dotted increasing curve in Figure 1 (b) depicts ˜ w1(L1; pA
1 ). Since economies
of scale are external to ﬁrms (and workers), this curve is not perceived by them.8
Note that as ² approaches unity this curve approaches a horizontal line.
Now let us move to the trading situation with a ﬁxed free-trade price ratio
(p1=p2)
T (Figure 2). If the terms of trade are given by the slope of the line PD
(i.e., the free-trade relative price of good 1 is higher than autarkic price ratio),
the economy specializes in good 1 at point P. Assume that consumption occurs
at point C located on the consumption possibility frontier PD, so that CBP
is the trade triangle (the country exports BP units of good 1 and imports BC
units of good 2).
Now we can decompose the movement toward the trading equilibrium into
two steps, which is in line with the traditional separation of trade gains into con-
sumption and production gains.9 Firstly, suppose that in the short run, labor
allocation is ﬁxed, and thus the economy is staying at the autarky production
point, A, while it is able to trade at the terms of trade pT ´ (p1=p2)
T. Su-
perscript T denotes the trading equilibrium. Then, the consumption possibility
frontier expands from V AP to V 0AP as in Figure 2 (a).10 In Figure 2 (b), this
change can be illustrated as an increase in the wage rate for the workers em-
ployed in sector 1 [i.e., from pA
1 =aL1(LA
1 ) to pT
1 =aL1(LA
1 )]. Their total increase
in wage income is represented by the dotted rectangle in Panel (b), which is
shown as V V 0 in Panel (a). It is also important to note that, as the result of
moving from autarkic price to the free-trade price, the curve of hypothetical
wage in sector 1, ˜ w1(L1; p1), shifts up from ˜ w1(L1; pA
1 ) to ˜ w1(L1; pT
1 ).
Next, let us consider the (long-run) labor movement between sectors. Since
sector 1 oﬀers a higher wage rate, workers will gradually move from sector 2
to sector 1 (as shown by the arrows in Figure 2). Due to external economies
8Alternatively, we may assume that all agents know this relationship but they do not act
on it because individually they are atomistic.
9See, for example, Dixit and Norman (1980, pp. 71–72).
10At the production point A, under free trade consumers will consume more of good 2 than
before, because good 2 becomes relatively cheaper than under autarky, pT > pA.
4of scale, each unit of labor moved from sector 2 to sector 1 generates a larger
output increase than the previous unit, which implies a higher wage rate, i.e. a
movement along the ˜ w1(L1; pT
1 ) curve. In Panel (b), the eventual distribution of
labor force will be one of complete sepecialization (with O1O2 workers in sector
1), which corresponds to the production point P in Panel (a). The eﬀect of this
labor movement among sectors is shown as the expansion of the consumption
possibility frontier from V 0AP to DP in Panel (a), reﬂected by the sum of
the horizontally shaded area and the vertically shaded area in Panel (b). It is
important to note that, by utilizing a labor market graph, the gains from labor
movement can be decomposed into (1) direct gains from labor movement (the
horizontally shaded area) and (2) indirect gains via external economies of scale
(the vertically shaded area). Note that the direct gains from labor movement
also exists under constant-returns-to-scale technology. Note also that, the higher
is the numerical value of ², the bigger are the indirect gains.
In terms of the numeraire, trade gains are measured by V D in Panel (a),
and by the sum of the dotted rectangle, the horizontally shaded rectangle, and
the vertically shaded rectangle in Panel (b).
We must now ﬁnd out what happens when pT
1 is lower than pA
1 (Figure 3).
In this case the curve of hypothetical wage in sector 1, ˜ w1(L1; p1), shifts down
from ˜ w1(L1; pA
1 ) to ˜ w1(L1; pT
1 ). The wage rate in sector 1 becomes lower and
workers will gradually moves from sector 1 to sector 2 (shown by the arrows
in Figure 3). The eventual distribution of labor force will be one with O1O2
workers in sector 2, which corresponds to the production point V in Panel (a).
The total income (in terms of the numeraire, good 2) is shown by the sum of the
shaded area and the horizontally shaded rectangle, which is same as the total
income under the autarky equilibrium. Since the price of good 1 becomes lower
in in terms of the numeraire, this implies an increase in total real income.
Now we can restate Ethier’s (1982) interesting result on trade gains under
external economies of scale.
Proposition 1 (Ethier):A small country entering into international trade will
be driven to specialize in that commodity with the lower autarkic relative price.
Regardless of which commodity that is, the small country will gain from free
trade relative to autarky.
Figure 3 also illustrates the possibility of multiple equilibria that can be
Pareto-ranked. Although when pT
1 is lower than pA
1 the economy gains relative
to its autarky welfare level (at A) by specializing in good 2, it can obtain a







(recall that by normalization, pT
2 = pA
2 = 1). By shifting labor force toward
sector 1 instead of sector 2, the economy can obtain the indirect gain via external
economies of scale. When the above inequality holds, the national income in
5terms of good 2 when the country produces at point P is ˜ w1(L; pT
1 )L, which is
greater than when it produces at point V . In Figure 3 (b) the extra gains from
specializing in good 1 is depicted by the vertically shaded rectangle.
When there are multiple equilibria, in general it is not clear which one is
likely to prevail, though some sort of stability argument may helps the equi-
librium selection.11 Myerson (2009, p. 1111) points out that the existence of
multiple equilibria is “a pervasive fact of life that needs be appreciated and
understood, not ignored by economists.”12
3 Discussion
Using the above illustration confers several advantages. First, since the labor-
market diagram emphasizes diﬀerences in wage rates between sectors in the
short run, it is easier to understand the process of factor movements from the
workers’ perspectives. Second, it is intuitive to see at ﬁrst the trade gains in
terms of labor income. This is later reinforced by the traditional separation of
trade gains into consumption and production gains. Third, the idea of multiple
equilibria and the stability considerations can be illustrated in a simple way.
Another major advantage relates to the sequencing of lectures of a typical
course of International Economics (or International Trade). Since both the
speciﬁc-factor model and the analysis of international factor movements make
extensive use of the graphs of labor-market (dis)equilibrium, it might be helpful
to provide a graph of the labor market in advance. The inclusion of labor market
graphs in the Ricardian Model under external economies of scale lecture lays a
useful groundwork for the later lectures.
We recognize that there are many alternative ways to show Ricardian trade
gains under external economies of scale. Still, we believe that the way presented
here provides some helpful tool for understanding (and teaching) Ricardian trade
models under external economies of scale.
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